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ARTICLES
I (WORTMAN) + 1 (FERENS) = 6 (YEARS): THAT
CAN'T BE RIGHT-CAN IT? STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS AND SUPREME COURT
INCONSISTENCY
David E. Seidelson*
Every virtue is laudable;
Kindness is a virtue;
Therefore confusion is laudable.'
That syllogism can't be right. The conclusion simply doesn't
follow from the major and minor premises.2 That's a little bit
like my reaction to two opinions of the Supreme Court, Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman3 and Ferens v. John Deere Co.'
In Wortman the Court held that a Kansas court, hearing an
action to recover prejudgment interest on suspended gas royal-
ties arising out of leased properties in Texas, Oklahoma and
Louisiana, was free to apply the Kansas statute of limitations,
under which the action was not barred. The Court concluded
that neither the Full Faith and Credit5 nor the Due Process
Clause8 required the forum to apply the statutes of limitations
of the three states whose substantive law governed the claims,
under which statutes the action would have been time-barred.
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.
The quoted syllogism is from WEBsTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcnoNARY. SECOND
EDITION 2554 (1939). Of course, I have substituted "confusion" for the actual word
"kindness."
2 For a discussion of the syllogism and deductive reasoning in the law, see RuGGMo
J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS. A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 53 (2d ed. 1989).
Like all of Judge Aldisert's writing, the book is a delight to read.
3 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
5 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, determined that neither
full faith and credit nor due process required the forum to aban-
don the traditional view that statutes of limitations are proce-
dural and therefore the forum is always constitutionally free to
apply its own statute.7 He declined Sun Oil's invitation to view
statutes of limitations as reflecting substantive policies, fearing
that to do so would compel the Court to "embark upon the en-
terprise of constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules, with no com-
pass to guide us beyond our own perceptions of what seems
desirable."8
Justice Brennan, concurring in the result achieved by the
Court, did so "through a somewhat different path of analysis."9
He viewed statutes of limitations as having "mixed substantive
and procedural aspects," reflecting a state's "balance between,
on the one hand, its substantive interest in vindicating substan-
tive claims and, on the other hand, a combination of its proce-
dural interest in freeing its courts from adjudicating stale claims
and its substantive interest in giving individuals repose from an-
cient breaches of law."' 0 Ultimately, he concluded that the fo-
rum's procedural interest made it constitutionally permissible
for the Kansas court to apply its own statute of limitations."
Let's attempt our own analysis of Wortman. The appropri-
ate backdrop for such an analysis is Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague.2 In Hague the Court concluded that the forum's appli-
cation of its own local law (permitting the stacking of uninsured
motorist coverage) rather than the potentially applicable local
law of a sister state (precluding the stacking of uninsured motor-
ist coverage) would be constitutionally permissible only if the fo-
rum had a significant interest in the application of its own law.
Consequently, in analyzing Wortman, we should attempt to de-
termine if Kansas had a significant interest in the application of
its own statute of limitations. The most efficient (and in my
opinion the only appropriate) method of attempting to answer
that question requires the identification of the reasons underly-
486 U.S. at 726, 730.
8 Id. at 727-28 (citations omitted).
' Id. at 735.
" Id. at 736.
" Id. at 738-39.
.2 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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ing statutes of limitations.13 There are, I believe, three such un-
derlying reasons, all arising out of a concern with stale claims:
(1) to protect the economic integrity of the defendant by assur-
ing that he will not suffer the imposition of liability based on
stale evidence, where the passage of time may have made it diffi-
cult for him to generate defensive evidence; (2) to assure the de-
fendant a period of repose, that is, a time beyond which he may
know that if he hasn't been sued he isn't going to be sued, at
least not successfully, so that he need not live forever under the
cloud of possible litigation; and (3) to protect the integrity of the
judicial process by assuring that the courts are not available in-
struments in which such stale claims may be pursued. 14 With
regard to the first two reasons, both aimed at protecting the de-
fendant, it seems obvious that the defendant's state of domicile
would have a significant interest in the application of its statute
of limitations, reflecting that state's view of when the potential
imposition of liability would unduly affect the defendant's eco-
nomic integrity and repose. With regard to the third reason, the
forum state would seem to have a significant interest in the ap-
plication of its statute of limitations, reflecting that state's view
of when entertaining the action would adversely affect the integ-
rity of its judicial process.
If the forum's statute of limitations were to bar the action,
it seems clear that the forum would have a significant interest in
the application of its statute as a means of protecting the integ-
rity of its judicial process. But if the forum's statute of limita-
tions were not to bar the action (as was the case in Wortman),
would the forum still have a significant interest in the applica-
tion of its own statute? After all, in those circumstances, hearing
the action would not threaten the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess in the forum, in the forum's own view. The forum would
seem to be left with only a negative "interest" in the application
" In my opinion such a method is superior to labeling statutes of limitations as
"procedural" for a couple of reasons. First, if the mere label were adequate justification
for the forum's application of its own law, courts might be tempted to label the state law
"procedural" as a means of circumventing the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses. Second, identifying the reasons for statutes of limitations permits a more spe-
cific determination of what the forum interest is in the application of its own statute.
" See David E. Seidelson, Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems Through Interest
Analysis in Personal Injury Actions: A Suggested Order of Priority Among Competing
State Interests and Among Available Techniques for Weighing Those Interests, 30 DuQ.
L. REv. (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems].
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of its own statute of limitations: its concern with protecting the
integrity of its judicial process would not be jeopardized by
hearing the action. That seems a slim interest on which to rest a
constitutional right to apply the forum's statute.
Nevertheless, let's accept, at least arguendo, the Court's
conclusion in Wortman: Kansas as forum was constitutionally
free to apply its own statute of limitations. Such tentative ac-
ceptance is made more palatable since, as both Justices Scalia
and Brennan noted, that conclusion does not mean that the fo-
rum's application of its own statute of limitations was the most
appropriate choice-of-law result available.15 It means only that
neither full faith and credit nor due process precluded Kansas
from achieving that result.16 And the Court has never suggested
that either clause requires the forum to achieve the best choice-
of-law result attainable.17
Then came Ferens. Plaintiff-husband, domiciled in Pennsyl-
vania, there lost a hand while operating a harvester manufac-
tured by the defendant, a Delaware corporation having its prin-
cipal place of business in Illinois. To recover for that injury and
the ensuing loss of consortium, plaintiffs sued the defendant in a
federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania and exercising di-
versity jurisdiction. That action was initiated more than two
years after the cause had arisen. Under Pennsylvania's statute of
limitations, both negligence and product liability actions in tort
would have been time-barred. 8 Consequently, in that action
11 [I]t is frequently the case under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a
court can lawfully apply either the law of one State or the contrary law of
another .... Today, for example, we do not hold that Kansas must apply its
own statute of limitations to a claim governed in its substance by another
State's law, but only that it may.
486 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J.).
The issue, after all, is not whether the decision to apply forum limitations law
is wise as a matter of choice-of-law doctrine but whether the decision is within
the range of constitutionally permissible choices ....
Id. at 739 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"e See note 15 supra.
"7 For a discussion of the method of weighing the forum's interest in applying its
own statute of limitations against the interest of another state in having its different
statute applied, for the purpose of achieving the most appropriate choice-of-law result,
see Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems, supra note 14.
18 In Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 467 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1983), the Supreme Court
of Pennsylania held that a product liability action would be governed by the state's two-
year tort statute of limitations but that a personal injury action predicated on breach of
implied warranty would be governed by the U.C.C.'s four-year statute of limitations
[Vol. 57: 787
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plaintiffs asserted only contract and warranty claims.' 9 However,
the plaintiffs initiated a second action against the defendant in a
federal district court sitting in Mississippi and exercising diver-
sity jurisdiction. That action alleged negligence and product lia-
bility, neither time-barred under Mississippi's six-year statute of
limitations.20 Plaintiffs then filed a 1404(a)21 motion to transfer
the Mississippi action to the district court in Pennsylvania. De-
fendant did not oppose the motion and the court granted it. The
district court in Pennsylvania consolidated the transferred tort
action with the pending warranty action. Then the court granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss the tort action, holding that,
"because the Ferenses had moved for transfer as plaintiffs, the
rule in Van Dusen [v. Barrack]2 2 did not apply.123 Conse-
quently, the court imposed Pennsylvania's two-year statute of
limitations under which the tort action was time-barred.
The Third Circuit affirmed, but on a different basis. The
Third Circuit concluded that, "because Mississippi had no legiti-
mate interest in the case," application of that state's six-year
statute of limitations would violate the due process rights of the
defendant.2 4 The Supreme Court vacated that decision and re-
manded25 in light of Wortman, "in which we held that a State
may choose to apply its own statute of limitations to claims gov-
erned by the substantive laws of another State without violating
either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process
commencing on the date of sale. The effect of Williams is to give the plaintiff the option
of asserting tort liability governed by a two-year statute or warranty liability governed
by a four-year statute. In Ferens the plaintiffs opted for the second alternative in the
action filed in the diversity court sitting in Pennsylvania.
19 See note 18 supra.
'o "The Mississippi courts.. .would apply Mississippi's 6-year statute of limita-
tions to the tort claim arising under Pennsylvania law and the tort action would not be
time-barred under the Mississippi statute. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972)." 110 S.
Ct. at 1278.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.").
22 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See text accompanying note 28 infra for an explanation of
Van Dusen.
110 S. Ct. at 1278.
24 Id.
2Ferens v. Deere & Co., 487 U.S. 1212 (1988). The Court's order reads: "The peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for further consideration in
light of Sun Oil Company v. Wortman, 486 U.S. [717] (1988)." Id. at 1212-13.
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Clause."26 On remand, the Third Circuit again affirmed the dis-
missal of the tort action, holding that Van Dusen was not appli-
cable to a 1404(a) transfer initiated by a plaintiff.27
In Van Dusen the Court had held that, in a diversity action
in which the defendant secured a 1404(a) transfer, the transferee
court was required to utilize the same conflicts rule as would
have been employed by the transferor court.28 The basic ration-
ale for that decision was the Court's conclusion that 1404(a) was
not intended to permit the defendant to secure not only a more
convenient forum but a more favorable choice-of-law result as
well. In Van Dusen the Court "left open the question" of
whether the same rule applied where the plaintiff had secured
the transfer.2" Ferens confronted the Court with that issue.
Before examining the method of resolution utilized and the
conclusion achieved by the Court, we should note a preliminary
matter: the propriety of the Court's vacating the Third Circuit's
first ruling in light of Wortman. It's true, as we have seen, that
in Wortman the Court held that the forum was constitutionally
free to apply its own statute of limitations to actions governed
by the substantive laws of another state. But how did that hold-
ing apply to Ferens? There, Mississippi, and therefore the diver-
sity court sitting in Mississippi, would have been free to apply
that state's six-year statute even though the tort action may
have been governed by the substantive law of Pennsylvania. The
rationale of that conclusion, as drawn from Wortman, would be
the forum's inherent interest as forum in applying its own stat-
ute of limitations as a means of protecting the integrity of its
judicial process. But once the plaintiffs' 1404(a) transfer motion
was granted, Mississippi no longer enjoyed the status of forum.
It was Pennsylvania and the diversity court in Pennsylvania
upon whom the mantle of forum was draped. And rather clearly,
given that state's two-year statute of limitations, Pennsylvania
and the diversity court sitting there had a significant interest in
the application of that statute for the purpose of protecting the
integrity of the judicial process. After transfer, Mississippi had
2 110 S. Ct. at 1278-79.
2 110 S. Ct. at 1279 (citing Ferens v. Deere & Co., 862 F.2d 21 (3rd Cir. 1988)). This
was the same ground on which the Pennsylvania district court had based its decision.
See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.




no such interest since no court in Mississippi would any longer
be implicated in the action. Absent such a Mississippi interest,
imposing that state's six-year statute on a court sitting in Penn-
sylvania would appear to violate both the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the due process rights of the defendant. Wortman,
after all, recognized the forum's constitutional right to apply its
own statute of limitations. In Ferens the ultimate forum was
Pennsylvania. Consequently, it is by no means clear that Wort-
man required vacating the Third Circuit's first decision in Fer-
ens. Indeed, Wortman would seem to support, rather than pro-
hibit, the conclusion that imposing Mississippi's six-year statute
on a court sitting in Pennsylvania would be violative of both the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the due process rights of the
defendant.
How did the Court in Ferens square this seemingly inappro-
priate application of Wortman? Justice Kennedy wrote the
Court's opinion. Surprisingly (at least to me), he directed no at-
tention to the propriety of the Court's having vacated the Third
Circuit's first decision on the basis of Wortman. He simply
stated the Court's earlier action as part of the procedural history
of Ferens2° Then he moved directly to what he perceived to be
the only issue presented:
Section 1404(a) states only that a district court may transfer
venue for the convenience of the parties and witnesses when in the
interest of justice. It says nothing about choice-of-law, and nothing
about affording plaintiffs different treatment from defendants. We
touched upon these issues in Van Dusen, but left open the question
presented in this case.3 1
That question, in Justice Kennedy's view, was whether Van Du-
sen required the transferee court to apply the same choice-of-
law rule that would have been applied by the transferor court
when the transfer had been achieved by the plaintiff. He an-
swered that question affirmatively, and therefore the Court, di-
viding 5-4, reversed the Third Circuit's second decision and re-
manded the case with instruction that the court apply
Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations.
Again surprisingly (at least to me), the Court directed no
significant discussion to the question of whether, in the circum-
1* 110 S. Ct. at 1278-79. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
31 110 S. Ct. at 1279.
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stances of Ferens, a 1404(a) motion should be available to a
plaintiff.32 The Court simply assumed an affirmative answer to
that question. There is nothing in the explicit language of
1404(a) or, so far as I can determine, in its "scant"33 legislative
history that would compel such a conclusion. Moreover, there is
a certain facial incongruity in the conclusion that a plaintiff, af-
ter selecting the forum of his choice, can, without any change in
the posture of the case or in the litigants involved, then move for
transfer to a more convenient forum. 4 If, after initiation of the
action, the defendant were to assert a counterclaim or a set-off
or implead a third-party defendant, or if such a third-party de-
fendant were to assert a cross-claim against the plaintiff, there
might well be a rational basis for the plaintiff's assertion that
the change in the posture of the case or in the litigants involved
suggested that the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
the interest of justice would better be served by a transfer to
some other federal court. But there was no such change in Fer-
ens. The action transferred was precisely the action initiated by
the plaintiffs, and the only parties were the plaintiffs and the
defendant sued by them. In those circumstances, I think it
would have been sensible for the Court to conclude that a
1404(a) transfer was simply unavailable to the plaintiffs. That
determination, of course, would have mooted the issue resolved
by the Court. But, as already noted, the Court simply assumed
32 So far as I can determine, the Court has never directed significant inquiry into
the circumstances in which a plaintiff may utilize 1404(a). In GENE R. SHREVE & PETER
RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 140 (1989), this language appears:
"[U]nlike forum non conveniens dismissals, transfers of venue between federal courts are
available to plaintiffs and defendants alike." There are no accompanying citations. In
JOHN J. COUND ET AL.. CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 328 (5th ed. 1989): "Can
plaintiffs as well as defendants transfer an action under Section 1404(a)? What circum-
stances might motivate a plaintiff to request a transfer of venue? See generally Torres v.
Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), certiorari denied 350 U.S. 836 ... (1955); Philip Carey
Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 286 F.2d 782 (6th Cir..1961) .... In Torres the court declined to
find an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in granting such a transfer,
but devoted no significant discussion to the fact that plaintiff had sought the transfer. In
Taylor the court wrote: "We find no abuse of discretion on the part of [the district
court] in making the transfer. The right to a transfer under the statute is available to a
plaintiff as well as a defendant. A plaintiff is not bound by his choice of forums, if he
later discovers that there are good reasons for transfer." 286 F.2d at 784.
My own view as to when a plaintiff should be permitted to utilize 1404(a) is set forth
in the text at notes 34-35 & 53 infra.
33 110 S. Ct. at 1280.
31 See note 32 supra.
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the availability of 1404(a) to the plaintiffs, thereby generating
the issue resolved by the Court.
What led the Court to resolve that issue by holding that
Van Dusen was applicable even when the transfer had been on
the plaintiffs' motion? Justice Kennedy identified three distinct
reasons for the Court's decision:
First, § 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state law advantages
that exist absent diversity jurisdiction. Second, § 1404(a) should not
create or multiply opportunities for forum shopping. Third, the deci-
sion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) should turn on considerations
of convenience and the interest of justice rather than on the possible
prejudice resulting from a change of law.35
As the Court noted, the first reason "has its real foundation
in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. . . ."" The basic rationale of Erie
is that the accident of diverse citizenship should not produce a
result substantially different from that which would be achieved
by the highest appellate court of the forum state. The Erie ra-
tionale, in turn, raises this question in Ferens: Which state, Mis-
sissippi or Pennsylvania, should be characterized as the forum
state? Given that the underlying issue in Ferens was which
state's statute of limitations should be applied, and given Wort-
man's conclusion that the forum state is constitutionally free to
apply its own statute of limitations because of the forum's inter-
est in protecting the integrity of its judicial process, it would
seem to follow that the state in which the action is to be tried
should be characterized as the forum state. After all, it is that
state whose judicial process, either in the form of a state court or
of a diversity court sitting within that state, will be implicated.
And, of course, in Ferens that state was Pennsylvania.
That conclusion, in turn, raises a subsidiary question: Does
Pennsylvania's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial
process extend to a federal court sitting in Pennsylvania and ex-
ercising diversity jurisdiction? I suppose it could be asserted
that in those circumstances Pennsylvania would be no more
than an officious intermeddler should it attempt to impose its
concern with protecting judicial integrity in that state on a fed-
eral court, even one sitting in Pennsylvania and exercising diver-
sity jurisdiction. The assertion, however, should be rejected, for




a couple of intimately related reasons. First, when a diversity
court finds itself confronted with a choice-of-law problem, that
court is required by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufactur-
ing Co. 37 to resolve that problem precisely as it would be re-
solved by the highest appellate court of the forum state. If the
choice-of-law problem goes to which state's statute of limitations
should be applied, that of the forum or that of some other state,
one of the reasons underlying the forum's statute is certain to be
the protection of the integrity of the judicial process within that
state. If the diversity court were free to disregard that underly-
ing reason, the court might very well resolve the choice-of-law
problem differently than would the highest appellate court of
the forum state, perhaps applying the statute of the other state
when the forum would apply its own statute. Clearly, that would
violate the Supreme Court's mandate in Klaxon. Therefore,
Klaxon suggests that the forum state's interest in protecting the
integrity of the judicial process within that state does extend to
a diversity court sitting within that state. Second, in Ferens it is
obvious that the action will be tried before a diversity court sit-
ting in Pennsylvania, not a diversity court sitting in Mississippi.
If, in those circumstances, the court were compelled to apply
Mississippi's six-year statute (as the Supreme Court's opinion in
Ferens mandates), the accident of diverse citizenship would pro-
duce a result (nondismissal) substantially different from that
which the highest appellate court of the actual forum state
(Pennsylvania) would achieve (dismissal). Or, to put it more
bluntly, the plaintiffs would be empowered to circumvent Penn-
sylvania's two-year statute because of the accident of diverse cit-
izenship and the availability of a 1404(a) transfer from Missis-
sippi to Pennsylvania. For both of those reasons, I am impelled
toward the conclusion that Pennsylvania's interest in protecting
the integrity of the judicial process within that state extends to
a diversity court sitting within that state.
Moreover, that second consideration seems to refute the
first reason for the Court's conclusion in Ferens. It seems fairly
clear that, "absent diversity jurisdiction, ' 38 the plaintiffs would
have been unable to litigate the time-barred tort action in Penn-
sylvania. The defendant would have enjoyed the "state law ad-
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
'8 110 S. Ct. at 1280.
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vantage[]" 39 of having that action dismissed. Yet, by invoking a
combination of diversity jurisdiction (in Mississippi) and a
1404(a) transfer (to the diversity court in Pennsylvania), the
plaintiffs were permitted by the Court's opinion to "deprive"40
the defendant of the Pennsylvania right to have the tort action
dismissed.
The second reason for the Court's opinion identified by Jus-
tice Kennedy was that "§ 1404(a) should not create or multiply
opportunities for forum shopping."41 But, of course, the Court's
opinion does just that. By imposing Mississippi's six-year statute
on the diversity court in Pennsylvania, the Court made it possi-
ble for the plaintiffs, by selecting a diversity court in Mississippi
and then utilizing 1404(a), to circumvent Pennsylvania's two-
year statute. That's the epitome of forum shopping.
Justice Kennedy's third reason was that "the decision to
transfer venue under § 1404(a) should turn on considerations of
convenience and the interest of justice rather than on the possi-
ble prejudice resulting from a change of law."' 42 Since it was the
plaintiffs who sought and secured the 1404(a) transfer, it seems
appropriate to determine if their convenience and the conve-
nience of their witnesses was served by imposing the Mississippi
statute on the diversity court in Pennsylvania. Substantively, of
course, the plaintiffs were significantly advantaged by that im-
position: their tort action, time-barred by Pennsylvania's stat-
ute, could not be dismissed by the diversity court in Pennsylva-
nia. But such a substantive advantage is clearly not within the
"convenience" contemplated by 1404(a); the Court's first two
reasons and Van Dusen itself indicate that 1404(a) is not in-
tended to produce such a substantive advantage. Since the ac-
tion transferred pursuant to the plaintiffs' motion was precisely
the action the plaintiffs themselves had initiated in a diversity
court in Mississippi, with no change in claims or parties, it
would be spurious to suggest that the convenience of the parties
or the witnesses would be served by the imposition of Missis-
sippi's six-year statute on the diversity court in Pennsylvania.







sity court in Mississippi to the diversity court in Pennsylvania
would of course have served the convenience of the plaintiffs
and the witnesses. Such a transfer, leading to consolidation of
the tort and contract actions before the diversity court in Penn-
sylvania, would have spared the plaintiffs and the witnesses the
burden of duplicative litigation in two different courts and the
Pennsylvania witnesses the onus of traveling to Mississippi. But
the issue resolved by the Court in Ferens was not the propriety
of the 1404(a) transfer; defendant offered no opposition to the
plaintiffs' transfer motion, and the Court directed no considera-
tion to such propriety. The issue in Ferens was whether the
transfer required the imposition of the Mississippi statute on
the diversity court in Pennsylvania. A negative answer to that
question, rather than the affirmative answer given by the Court,
would have deprived the plaintiffs of no right under Pennsylva-
nia law and would have deprived them and the witnesses of no
convenience in the sense contemplated by 1404(a). The second
part of the Court's third reason was that transfer under 1404(a)
"should turn on . . . the interest of justice. '43 It seems apparent
that the Court's decision mandating the application of Missis-
sippi's six-year statute frustrated, rather than served, the inter-
est of justice. By that decision, the defendant was stripped of an
otherwise appropriate defense because of the accident of diverse
citizenship and the availability of 1404(a), the very kind of sub-
stantive disadvantage that Van Dusen had held was not in-
tended by 1404(a). Even the Court's own three reasons seem to
point toward a result contrary to that achieved by the Court.
Yet, the Court compelled the application of Mississippi's six-
year statute.
43 Id.
" Justice Kennedy wrote:
Our rule may seem too generous because it allows the Ferenses to have both
their choice of law and their choice of forum, or even to reward the Ferenses
for conduct that seems manipulative. We nonetheless see no alternative rule
that would produce a more acceptable risult. Deciding that the transferee law
should apply, in effect, would tell the Ferenses that they should have contin.
ued to litigate their warranty action in Pennsylvania and their tort action in
Mississippi. Some might find this preferable, but we do not. We have made
quite clear that "[tio permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely
the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to
the wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to
prevent." Contaminated Grain [Co. v. Barge FBL-585,] 364 U.S. [19], 26
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Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, wasn't having any. In-
stead of beginning and ending the inquiry with whether Van
Dusen applied to a 1404(a) transfer initiated by plaintiffs, Jus-
tice Scalia recognized a more basic question: Which should enjoy
precedence, Van Dusen or the Rules of Decision Act.40 The Act
provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.'0
The dissent treated the Act as the foundation on which Erie and
Klaxon rest.47 And, according to the dissent, both of those opin-
ions exist to assure that the accident of diverse citizenship does
not "'disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state
and federal courts sitting side by side.' "48 The dissent recog-
nized that under Van Dusen a 1404(a) transfer resulting from a
defendant's motion requires the transferee court to apply the
same law that would have been applied by the transferor court,
even though that law differs from that of the transferee state.
The dissent identified two closely related reasons for the Van
[1960] ....
110 S. Ct. at 1284.
The specter of such duplicative litigation and the resulting waste of time, energy,
and money is indeed haunting. But there are alternatives that would exorcise the demon.
The most immediate alternative in Ferens would be the result achieved by the dissent:
application of Pennsylvania's statute of limitations and dismissal of the tort action.
Would that result really tell the Ferenses (and others similarly situated) to try the war-
ranty action in Pennsylvania and the tort action in Mississippi? I doubt it. Absent the
1404(a) transfer and the CourJ's conclusion that the Mississippi statute was applicable,
common sense and practicality would probably lead the Ferenses and others similarly
situated to forsake the duplicative tort action in Mississippi. The Court's conclusion,
however, seems likely to encourage others similarly situated to follow the path of the
Ferenses and invoke the jurisdiction (and therefore the time and resources) of two differ-
ent federal courts and then to burden one of those courts further by imposing on it
consideration of a plaintiff's motion for 1404(a) transfer. That hardly seems calculated to
achieve the efficiency sought by Justice Kennedy. Moreover, as the dissent noted early
on in its opinion, the issue in Ferens did not begin and end with 1404(a) and judicial
efficiency. Ferens also implicated the Rules of Decision Act and the basic concepts of
federalism set forth therein and in Erie and Klaxon. See text accompanying note 45
infra.
" 110 S. Ct. at 1285 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See note 44 supra.
46 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
41 See note 44 supra.




First, we thought it highly unlikely that Congress, in enacting §
1404(a), meant to provide defendants with a device by which to ma-
nipulate the substantive rules that would be applied .... Second, we
concluded that the policies of Erie and Klaxon would be undermined
by application of the transferee court's choice-of-law principles in the
case of a defendant-initiated transfer. . . because then "the 'accident'
of federal diversity jurisdiction" would enable the defendant "to util-
ize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could not have
been achieved in the courts of the State where the action was
filed,". ... 4
The dissent then concluded that "neither of those considerations
is served-and indeed both are positively defeated-by a depar-
ture from Klaxon [where the 1404(a) transfer results from plain-
tiffs' motion]." 50 First, it seems equally unlikely that Congress in
enacting 1404(a) intended to permit a plaintiff to manipulate
the law that would be applied by filing in a court where he did
not intend to litigate and then, by securing a 1404(a) transfer, to
impose that law on the transferee court. Second, recognizing the
plaintiffs' ultimate intent to have the action tried in a diversity
court in Pennsylvania, the transferee state, it seems apparent
that requiring the transferee court to apply the law of Missis-
sippi, different from that of Pennsylvania, would generate a con-
flict between the diversity court and the state court "sitting side
by side" 51 in Pennsylvania, the true forum state. To the dissent,
"[t]he significant federal judicial policy expressed in Erie and
Klaxon is reduced to a laughingstock if it can so readily be
evaded through filing-and-transfer."52
As between the majority and the dissent, the latter, I be-
lieve, makes the more convincing case. First, the dissent recog-
nizes the applicability of the Rules of Decision Act and its inti-
mate relationship with Erie and Klaxon. Second, the dissent
identifies the policy reasons underlying Van Dusen. And third,
the dissent demonstrates that those reasons are disserved by the
result achieved by the majority. Add to this the fact that the
majority's own three reasons for its result tend to point to the
conclusion achieved by the dissent, and the dissent seems to
19 110 S. Ct. at 1285 (quoting Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638.)
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1285.




But there is another reason why the dissent's conclusion
commends itself to reason: Wortman. Ironically, while the Court
used Wortman to vacate the original opinion of the Third Cir-
cuit in Ferens, it made no further use of Wortman in achieving
the ultimate result in Ferens. I think it should have. The essence
of Wortman is that Kansas, the forum state, was constitution-
ally free to apply its own statute of limitations even though the
actions may have been governed by the substantive law of three
other states. Presumably, then, Pennsylvania, as the actual fo-
rum state in Ferens, should have been constitutionally free to
apply its statute of limitations to that case. To compel the diver-
sity court in Pennsylvania to apply the Mississippi statute seems
to vitiate that constitutional freedom of Pennsylvania.
Indeed, there are two considerations that lend an a fortiori
emphasis to that conclusion. First, in Ferens, unlike Wortman,
Pennsylvania wasn't simply the forum; it was the state in which
significant portions of the operative facts had occurred. It was in
Pennsylvania that plaintiff-husband's use of the defendant's
product caused injury to a Pennsylvania victim. And, of course,
plaintiff-wife, seeking consortium damages, was also domiciled
in Pennsylvania. Second, and perhaps more critical, in Ferens,
unlike Wortman, the statute of limitations of the forum state
(Pennsylvania) would have barred the tort action. The forum's
interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process is more
seriously implicated when its limitations statute would preclude
litigation of the stale action (Ferens) than when it would permit
such litigation (Wortman). In Ferens, Pennsylvania's two-year
statute of limitations, properly invoked by the defendant in the
diversity court, stands as a rather emphatic "Thou shalt not."
And one of the reasons underlying that commandment is Penn-
sylvania's desire to assure that the courts of that state will not
be available as instruments for litigating such stale claims. As we
noted earlier, Pennsylvania's concern with protecting the integ-
rity of the judicial process in-state should be deemed applicable
in a diversity court sitting in Pennsylvania.
Ferens is disappointing to me for several reasons. First, it's
almost beyond belief that neither the majority nor the dissent
gave serious consideration to whether or in what circumstances a
plaintiff should be considered free to seek a 1404(a) transfer. It
seems to me that in a case like Ferens, where the posture of the
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litigation and the identity of the litigants remain exactly as they
were when the plaintiff initiated the action, the plaintiff should
be precluded from seeking such a transfer.53 In those circum-
stances, there should arise a conclusive presumption that the fo-
rum selected by the plaintiff is the most appropriate one from
the perspective of the plaintiff. Not to so hold is to invite the
quandary created by Ferens. Second, it's inexplicable (at least to
me) that the majority never devoted significant attention to the
Rules of Decision Act, and perhaps as a consequence, offered
three reasons for the Court's conclusion that seem to point more
appropriately to the result achieved by the dissent. And finally,
it's extraordinary that, after the Court had relied on Wortman
to vacate the original Third Circuit opinion in Ferens, neither
majority nor dissent considered the impact of the rationale of
Wortman in ultimately resolving Ferens. Such confusion really
is not laudable.
" See note 32 supra.
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